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Family firm is the earliest model in the development of enterprises. With the 
development of modern corporate governance theory, the research of family-business 
governance is prospering, and mainly focuses on ownership structure, firm value and 
earnings management except on the control power of family firm which begins 
relatively late and has no consistent view of the definition. At the same time, as a key 
measure standard of earnings quality, earnings conservatism still lacks an authoritative 
and widely accepted definition though it has existed for a long time. Therefore, this 
empirical study aims to provide an empirical support to the related research by 
combining controversial listed family firm with earnings conservatism.This 
dissertation trys to find out the empirical evidence of how the control power of listed 
family firms affects the earnings conservatism. It will offer empirical support for the 
regulation of control power of listed family firms and the regulations of accounting 
information, particularly earnings information. 
This dissertation uses earnings conservatism as the focal point of research, and 
define control power from the point of de facto control, and investigate the effects of 
control power of listed family firms on the earnings conservatism. This research pays 
close attention to following factors: the control mode and the ratio of actual controller, 
the actual controller duality, ownership concentration and ownership balance. 
In accordance with Beaver and Ryan (2005) ’s research，earnings conservatism 
can be divided into conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism.The 
dissertation undertakes Basu (1997)’s model to research the earnings conservatism of 
listed family firms, and define the earnings conservatism according to Basu (1997), 
that is, earnings conservatism is the tendency of higher degree of verifiability on good 
news than that on bad news in the financial statements. Therefore, this dissertation 
researches the conditional earnings conservatism. 
The empirical research is divided into three levels for a layer of progressive 















sorted and divided into different groups. The preliminary investigation of the variation 
trend on the coefficients of the experimental variable between the minimum and 
maximum group shows the impact of the sorted variables on the earnings 
conservatism. The second level is the key point, studying the impact of each variable 
for control power on the earnings conservatism without consideration of control 
variables. The second level firstly uses the extended model of Basu (1997) to 
calculate the estimated earnings conservatism for each firm-year, and then according 
to Qiang(2007), averages the estimators and other variables in the model of each firm 
during the smaple period to obtain each firm’s earnings conservatism and explanatory 
variables, and finally constructs multi-regression model to test hypotheses. The third 
level is to examine the robustness of models and test whether these empirical results 
are significantly different by introducing several control variables. 
The empirical results show that earnings conservatism exists in Chinese A-share 
listed family firms during the sample period from 2003 to 2008. The control power 
ratio and the control mode, ownership concentration and ownership balance are 
related to earnings conservatism though these factors have great differences among 
family firms. The conclusions are as follows:(1) Different control ways of actual 
controllers have different impacts on the earnings conservatism, that is, the means of 
cross-shareholding and pyramid-shareholding present positive effects on earnings 
conservatism compared with the mean of multiple-shareholding. (2)The control power 
ratio and the ownership concentration hold significantly negative relations with 
earnings conservatism in the listed family firms. (3)The actual controller of family 
firms acted as a board chairman or general manager would enhance the earnings 
conservatism compared with that who control the firm by the way of direct holding 
and undertake the board chairman or general manager at the same time. (4)Ownership 
balance presents a significant positive relation with earnings conservatism. 
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